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THE (UN)FAIR CREDIT
REPORTING ACT
Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler*
I. INTRODUCTION
obert Burrell discovered that he was a victim of
identity theft in 2008.1 The thief used Mr. Burrell's
identity to purchase close to $10,000 in goods and
services using his credit card and to incur approximately
$1,000 in charges from a wireless telephone company.2
He repeatedly told the companies that his identity had
been stolen and that he was not responsible for the
charges.3 Nonetheless, the companies continued to re-
port to credit bureaus that Mr. Burrell failed to pay his
debts, resulting in negative and inaccurate information
on his credit report.4
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA") pur-
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Burrell v. DFS Servs., LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 438, 440 (D. N.J. 2010).2 id.
3Id.
4Id.
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ports to safeguard identity theft victims from this pre-
cise predicament, but its protections failed Mr. Burrell
because it lacks effective tools for consumers to enforce
them. As a consequence, one thief's actions over a few
months in 2008 impacted Mr. Burrell for several years. In
fact, when Mr. Burrell sued the companies for violations
of the FCRA and other relevant state laws, the court re-
luctantly dismissed his claims, finding that he lacked a
private right of action to enforce the companies' FCRA
duties or otherwise hold the companies liable.5
Mr. Burrell could not maintain claims against the
companies that furnished incorrect information to the
credit bureaus for two reasons. First, the FCRA bars con-
sumer lawsuits to enforce companies' duty to furnish ac-
curate information to the credit bureaus.6 It permits suit
against these companies only for failure to "reinvesti-
gate" a dispute made to the credit bureau concerning in-
accurate information.7 Enforcement of the accuracy norm
against these companies is left mostly to the public regu-
lators.8 Second, the FCRA preempted whatever state law
claims Mr. Burrell could have otherwise raised against
the companies.9
The judge who presided over Mr. Burrell's lawsuit
offered some blunt criticism for the FCRA's shortcom-
ings, which arise out of the rules governing its private
right of action and negatively impact the ability of con-
sumers to access justice."° Judge Debevoise chastised
Congress for creating a private right of action that
thwarts rather than promotes the FCRA's goals:
5 See generally id.
6 Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 444-49; 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).
7 Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 444-49; 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
8 See Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 444-49; 15 U.S.C. § 1681s.
' Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 449-51; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681h(e),
1681t(b)(1)(F).
10 Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 446 ("[Tihe FCRA places the burden of
ensuring the efficient functioning of the credit reporting system on
the consumers themselves-laypeople who are, in most cases, in no
position to carry out that task by jumping over the technical hurdles
created by the statute. Such a scheme is troubling, to say the least.").
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[C]ases like this one lead the Court to wonder
how Congress could have possibly believed that
the FCRA would carry out [its intended] func-
tions. It is of little value to ordinary consumers,
in part due to the fact that it is hopelessly com-
plex-the statute is drafted in hyper-technical
language and includes a sufficient number of in-
ternal cross-references to make even the most
dedicated legal practitioner consider a change in
career. But the FCRA's substance is even more
troubling than its complex form. The statute in-
cludes numerous provisions that limit consum-
ers' ability to enforce its mandates either by ex-
plicitly barring private actions or by imposing
such burdensome procedural requirements that
no layperson could possibly be expected to
comply.11
He also censured the defendants' expediency in
hiding behind the. technicalities of the statute to escape
liability for errors that it in fact made.12
The FCRA purports to ensure accuracy and confi-
dentiality of consumers' financial and other personal in-
formation by imposing substantive requirements on the
regulated entities. 3 These requirements may then be en-
forced through a combination of Congressionally-
mandated private and public mechanisms.14 Accuracy in
" Id. at 444 (internal citations omitted).
12 Id. ("Though the Court is loath to reward [the Defendants'] effort
to hide behind the esoteric strictures of the FCRA to defeat claims
by a layperson like Mr. Burrell-who could not possibly have been
expected to comply with the procedural requirements of that statute
and who attempted to address the theft of his identity in a manner
that most similarly-situated consumers would consider reasonable-
Defendants' arguments relating to Mr. Burrell's FCRA claims are le-
gally, if not morally, correct").
13 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) et seq.
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n (civil liability for willful noncompliance with
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consumer credit reporting is fundamental to an individ-
ual consumer's access to credit at fair rates as well as
other services and opportunities. 5 Unfortunately, as Mr.
Burrell and many other consumers have learned,1 6 alt-
hough FCRA imposes duties on the credit reporting in-
dustry to ensure accuracy, the statute's mechanisms for
enforcing those duties and the norms it purports to
promote are inadequate.
The blame for the failure of FCRA enforcement lies
with Congress. Enforcement mechanisms, private and
public, are tools of policy implementation. Congress cre-
ates and deploys these tools to enforce the substantive
duties of the laws it enacts. The laws are only as effective
as the mechanisms Congress puts in place to enforce
them.
FCRA's flawed enforcement mechanisms are a re-
flection of Congressional priorities, legislative compro-
mise, and Congress's historically fragmented and reac-
tive approach to regulating the consumer credit market.
The result is a hybrid private-public enforcement regime
that is not cohesive and has created regulatory voids. For
example, although the FCRA includes a private right of
action to enforce its substantive obligations, it also con-
tains numerous provisions that limit consumers' ability
to enforce those provisions either by expressly preclud-
the FCRA), 1681o (civil liability for negligent noncompliance with the
FCRA), and 1681s (providing for public enforcement).
'5 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TiE CONSUMER CREDIT AND SALES
LEGAL PRACTICE SERIES: FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 1.1.1 (8th ed. 2013) ("A
good credit history is a significant asset for many consumers. In-
formation contained in a consumer's credit reporting file affects
their access to home mortgages, care loans, credit cards, utility ser-
vices, residential tenancies, employment, and even insurance. In ad-
dition, it can control the rate at which consumers may obtain cred-
it.").
16 60 Minutes: 40 Million Mistakes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate?,
(CBS television broadcast Aug. 25, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/40-million-mistakes-is-your-credit-
report-accurate-25-08-2013 (featuring stories of consumers whose
efforts to correct credit reports errors were unsuccessful even after
years and with legal representation).
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ing individual suits or by imposing procedural hurdles
that are difficult to clear.17 Additionally, complexities
and ambiguities in the statute have given rise to a num-
ber of lower court divisions about the scope of the pri-
vate right of action, only further impeding the FCRA's ef-
ficacy." Finally, pre-financial crisis public enforcement of
the FCRA was not particularly robust, which meant that
the public regulator did not comprehensively police the
behavior of the regulated entities. r9
This Article deconstructs the FCRA's enforcement
regime, catalogs its flaws, and recommends how Con-
gress could design a more effective enforcement regime.
Section II briefly explains the purposes and history of the
FCRA. Section III outlines the parameters of its enforce-
ment model. Section IV examines the failure of FCRA en-
forcement. Finally, Section V charts a path of recommen-
dations for Congress to consider in restructuring the
FCRA's enforcement mechanisms in order to promote
the statute's accuracy norm.
II. THE FCRA
The Fair Credit.Reporting Act ("FCRA"), enacted in
1970, governs the collection, compilation, and use of
consumer credit information and provides the regulatory
framework for the credit reporting system in the United
States." Congress enacted the FCRA to ensure accuracy
17 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) (imposing a duty of accuracy on
companies that furnish information to credit bureaus but barring a
private right of action for consumers to enforce that duty).
18 See Section IV.B, infra.
'9 See Section V.A, infra.
20 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Credit bureaus collect and assemble an
individual consumer's credit information for use by lenders, insur-
ance companies, employers, landlords, and other entities in making
decisions affecting a consumer's eligibility for credit, insurance, em-
ployment and other purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b for a list of
permissible uses of consumer reports. Information included in con-
sumer reports generally may include consumers' credit history and
payment patterns, as well as demographic and identifying infor-
mation and public record information (e.g., arrests, judgments, and
bankruptcies). Consumer report information may be used by lenders
242
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and privacy of consumers' personal and financial infor-
mation for the protection of consumers and the efficient
functioning of the banking system.21 To that end, the
FCRA regulates the activities of three categories of enti-
ties in the nationwide consumer reporting system: (1)
consumer reporting agencies ("credit reporting agencies"
or "credit bureaus"); 2 (2) those who use consumer re-
ports ("users") such as lenders, insurance companies,
and prospective employers; and (3) those who furnish in-
formation to credit reporting agencies ("furnishers"). 21
The FCRA purports to fulfill its purposes by imposing
substantive requirements on the entities the statute reg-
ulates. For example, the FCRA requires that credit bu-
reaus "adopt reasonable procedures" to maintain "confi-
dentiality, accuracy, relevance, and proper utilization of"
consumer credit information.24 Users may only solicit
consumer reports for a permissible purpose and to noti-
fy consumers of any adverse action concerning an exten-
sion of credit, both provided for in the FCRA-25 These re-
quirements may then be enforced through a combination
of Congressionally-mandated public and private mecha-
and other users to predict the risk of future nonpayment, default, or
other adverse events.
21 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (stating Congressional findings and statement of
purpose). See also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT: FORTY YEARS OF
EXPERIENCE WiTH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF REPORT
WITH INTERPRETATIONS 1 (Jul. 2011) available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/40-
years-experience-fair-credit-reporting-act-ftc-staff-report-summary-
interpretations/i 1072 Ofcrareport.pdf (acknowledging that the FCRA
is designed to (1) prevent inaccurate or misleading information in
consumer credit reports; (2) "prevent misuse of sensitive consumer
information;" and (3) "promote the efficiency of the national banking
and consumer credit systems.").
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(t) and 1681a(p) defines "consumer reporting
agency" and "consumer reporting agency that compiles and main-
tains files on consumers on a nationwide basis."
23 A furnisher is an entity that provides information that relates to
consumers to a CRA for inclusion in consumer reports. 12 C.F.R. §
1022.41(c).
24 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
25 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b and 1681a(k).
2016 243
Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 28:2/3
nisms.26
Fair credit reporting promotes consumer access to
credit and other services and opportunities. Inaccurate
information on a consumer's credit report can have dev-
astating results for that individual's access to credit, em-
ployment, insurance, or even a place to live.28 Incomplete
and inaccurate consumer reports harm consumers in
terms of their ability to obtain credit at fair rates. 29 A
lender considers a consumer's credit history in evaluat-
ing her creditworthiness for all, kinds of credit from
mortgage and student loans to credit cards." A landlord
relies on a consumer's credit report to decide whether to
rent her property to a potential tenant. 1 A prospective
employer may use a credit report to decide whether to
hire a job applicant.32 An insurance company may use a
consumer's credit report to decide what rates to-under-
write insurance involving the consumer.33 Negative in-
formation on a consumer report translates into a lower
credit score, which in turn adversely affects a consum-
er's ability to obtain credit or insurance on favorable
terms, if at all, or to obtain employment. 4
Accuracy in credit reporting does not just protect
consumers. It is also important to efficient functioning
26 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s (administrative enforcement),
1681n (private right of action for willful violation of the FCRA), and
1681o (private right of action for negligent violation of the FCRA).
27 Credit Reports: What Accuracy and Errors Means for Consumers,
Hrg. before the Subcomm. On Consumer Protection, Product Safety,
and Insurance, S. Hrg. 113-060 (May 7, 2013).
28 See id.
29 See id.
'o See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).
3" See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F).
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(C).
14 CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
PoLIcY 273 (2016). Hoofnagle also discusses the ambiguities sur-
rounding how credit sores are calculated and used. As is generally
understood, the Fair Isaac Corporation, or FICO, score is most widely
used, but the FCRA does not mandate a particular scoring model or
methodology and multiple scoring systems exist.
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of the credit markets and central to a healthy economy. 5
Accordingly, all credit reporting industry participants
should want the FCRA to advance accuracy in consumer
reporting.
Developments in technology and the contemporary
market for consumer credit have put a spotlight on FCRA
enforcement and its shortcomings. These developments
include the exponential rise in the use of consumer cred-
it and in the volume of credit transactions, as well as the
automation of the credit reporting industry. 6 Each of the
big three credit bureaus-Equifax, Experian, and
TransUnion-currently maintains at least 200 million in-
dividual consumer files.37 Approximately 10,000 entities
furnish information to them about individual consum-
ers.38 These entities transmit information on over 1.3 bil-
lion consumer credit accounts every month.39 These de-
velopments, combined with the rise of identity theft in
the 1990s, all heighten the risk that an individual con-
sumer's credit history contains inaccurate and negative
35 Id.
36 Robert Hunt, A Century of Consumer Credit Reporting in America
(Fed. Res. Bank. Phil., Working Paper No. 05-13, Jun. 2005).
31 See Sarver v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir.
2004) (documenting that Experian processes over 50 million updates
daily on approximately 200 million individual consumer files);
Jianqing Wu v. Trans Union, 2006 WL 4729755, * 7 (D. Md.) (same
regarding Equifax); Brief of Amicus Curiae Trans Union, LLC, 2006
WL 3355849, * 1, filed in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47 (2007) (stating that Trans Union's database contains approxi-
mately 3.7 billion items of information associated with approximate-
ly 200 million consumers and receives over 2 billion pieces of data
per month from approximately 85,000 furnishers). See also Tara
Seigel Bernard, TransUnion, Equifax, and Experian Agree to Overhaul
Credit Reporting Practices, NEW YoRK TiMEs (Mar. 9, 2015) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/business/big-credit-
reporting-agencies-to-overhaul-error-fixing-process.html?_r=0.
38 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: KEY DIMENSIONS AND
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF HOW THE
NATION'S LARGEST CREDIT BUREAUS MANAGE CONSUMER DATA 3 (Dec.
2012).
39 Id.
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information. 0
When Congress enacted the FCRA, legislators be-
lieved the reporting of inaccurate and misleading infor-
mation was the most serious problem in the credit re-
porting industry.41 By the mid-1990s, it became clear that
consumer report inaccuracies failed to abate despite
passage of the FCRA, and the challenges of correcting
them continued to plague consumers and credit report-
ing agencies.42 Congress largely attributed these prob-
40 See, e.g. Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, be-
fore the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Cred-
it of the House Committee on Financial Services Regarding the Role
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in the Credit Granting Process (Jun.
12, 2003) available at.
https://epic.org/privacy/preemption/plunkett6.12.03 .pdf.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
42 S. Rep. 104-85 at 18 ("To generalize, the chief concerns that are
implicated by the FCRA are: 1. the accuracy of consumer reports and
problems associated with resolving disputed information; 2. the pri-
vacy concerns raised by unfettered access to consumers reports; 3.
operational concerns implicated by differing statutory schemes reg-
ulating the credit reporting industry at the state level; and 4. ambi-
guities as to what constitutes a "consumer report" for the purposes
of the FCRA that have hampered the business operations of both
credit reporting bureaus and credit report user."). H.R. Rep. 103-486
("The most common compliant [sic] that the Committee has received
regarding that credit reporting system is that consumer reports are
riddled with errors, and that even after incorrect or incomplete in-
formation is discovered, it can be virtually impossible to correct the
information in the consumer's file. In many cases, once an error is
discovered by the consumer, it takes several months and sometimes
years to have it corrected. Moreover, there is no assurance that, once
inaccurate and incomplete information is corrected in a consumer's
file, it will remain corrected. The problem with consumer report er-
rors and the difficulty involved in promptly correcting those errors
was revealed to the Committee during its hearings on the FCRA over
the past several years. Consumer advocates, state law enforcement
officials, and federal regulators all testified that the number of er-
rors in consumer reports was unacceptably high and that the pro-
cess for reinvestigating consumer disputes was lengthy and ineffi-
cient. The FTC has testified that the number of complaints about the
credit reporting industry exceeded the number for any other catego-
ry of complaints in both 1991 and 1992 and predicted the same re-
246 Vol. 28:2/3
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lems to the increased use of computers to transmit and
store consumer information, and the increased volume
of data that need to be transmitted and recorded due to
the rise of consumer credit use.43 One industry expert
added that the credit reporting market offered little in-
centive to police and correct accuracy problems because
lenders rather than borrowers were the credit reporting
agencies' primary customers. 44 As such, Congress
amended the statute in 1996, approximately 25 years af-
ter it first enacted the FCRA.45
The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of
1996 (the "CCRRA") extensively amended the FCRA in a
number of areas, mostly designed to address inaccuracy
issues under the guise of increased consumer protec-
tion.46 To that end, the amendments imposed new duties
suit for 1993.").
41 S. Rep. 104-85 at 18 ("A number of problems in the FCRA's imple-
mentation and interpretation have arisen in the years since the law's
enactment. Many of these problems are a result of ambiguities in
the statute; other problems have arisen as the credit reporting in-
dustry has grown in the wake of information technology advances
that have occurred over the last twenty years.").
44 Hearing before the Subcomm. On Consumer Affairs and Coinage of
the H. Comm. On Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.
60-61 (1991) (statement of Dr. Cunan, Georgetown Univ. School of
Bus. Admin.).
41 Congress has amended the FCRA several times, most notably in
1996 and 2003. The two most extensive amendments were the Con-
sumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 ("the CCRRA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996) and the Fair and Accurate Credit Trans-
actions Act of 2003 ("FACTA"), Pub. L. No. 108-159 (Dec. 4, 2003).
46 Many of the changes contained in the CCRRA had been proposed
in prior bills in the Senate or House of Representatives in 1994 and
1995. These bills' legislative history is informative. In 1994, the
House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs approved
H.R. 1015, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994), the Consumer Reporting Re-
form Act of 1994, and the Senate passed S. 783, 103d Cong. (1st
Sess. 1994), the Consumer Reporting Act of 1994. In 1995, S. 650,
the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, was introduced but failed to pass. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-
185, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); H. Rep. 103-486, 103d Cong. (2d
Sess. 1994). See also Carol A. Ahern & Jeffrey P. Taft, The Consumer
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996: An Attempt to Make the Fair
Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 28:2/3
on the regulated entities with the goal of improving ac-
curacy in credit reporting.47 First, it expanded the duties
of credit bureaus, particularly in regard to their respons-
es to consumers' disputes. 41 Specifically, it established a
30-day time frame for completion of a reinvestigation,
mandated written notice to the consumer of the results
of the investigation within five days of its completion,
and added restrictions on the reinsertion of items that
were deleted following a dispute.49 The CCRRA also in-
creased the obligations of users of consumer reports,
particularly employers. 0
Most significantly, the CCRRA imposed duties on a
class of entities not previously treated - furnishers. 1 A
furnisher is an entity that provides information-positive
and negative-about consumers to the credit bureau to
include in consumer reports. 2 Most often furnishers are
lenders and creditors, entities that also purchase and use
credit reports to decide whether and on what terms to
provide credit to consumers.
Furnisher duties and liability, in particular, were
pressure points among legislators. 3 A strong lobby ar-
gued against imposing any liability on furnishers, citing
the risk of a dramatic increase in litigation. 4 The bill that
passed was a compromise on furnisher liability, preclud-
ing consumers from privately enforcing the furnishers'
new duty of accuracy while allowing them to sue to en-
force furnishers' duty to reinvestigate disputed report
information following a consumer's complaint to the
Credit Reporting Act More Fair, 51 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 304, 314
(1997).
47 See generally id.
48 Pub. L. No. 104-208 codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
49 id.
'0 Pub. L. No. 104-208 codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m.
"' Pub. L. No. 104-208 codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2.
52 12 C.F.R. § 1022.41(c).
" Hearing before the Subcomm. On Consumer Affairs & Coinage of
the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 84, 86
(1991).
54 Id.
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credit bureau." The CCRRA also increased remedies for
civil liability 6 and expanded enforcement authority for
the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC"), giving it pow-
er to sue in federal court for violations of the FCRA. 7
Congress then passed the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 (the "FACTA"), which further
amended the FCRA. 8 These amendments focused on
preemption, identify theft, and accuracy issues.59
Industry was concerned over the imminent expira-
tion of FCRA's preemption of certain state causes of ac-
tion, and wanted to shore up continued preemption of
those state laws.60 Between 1996 and 2003, the incidence
of identity theft had escalated and reached an intolerable
level, and industry was concerned about liability under
state legislation.61 Industry convinced Congress to per-
manently extend the FCRA's preemption of state laws,
"under the theory that states would create conflicting ob-
ligations that could harm a national consumer reporting
system. ' 62 The FTC supported industry over consumer in-
terests on this issue and its success was a foregone con-
clusion.63
S 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1999).
56 15 U.S.C. § 1681s.
57 Id.
58 FACTA, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (Dec. 4, 2003).
59 S. Rep. No. 108-166, 108th Congress, 1st Sess, Amending the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, p. 6-7 (Oct. 17, 2003); H. Rep. No. 108-263,
108th Congress, 1st Sess, Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
of 2003, p. 7 (Sept. 4, 2003).
60 Before FACTA, the FCRA provided that its preemptions of state
laws would not apply to state laws that were enacted after January 1,
2004 and that, offered consumers greater protections than those of
the FCRA. Congress not only eliminated that provision, it added a
long list of new preemptions that significantly limit states' abilities
to regulate much of the FCRA's subject matter and conduct re-
quirements. FACTA § 711 (2003).
61 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 30 at 276 ("The 1996 amendments
preempted state law until 2003, and during this time, identity theft
became a major concern and topic of state legislation.").
62 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 30 at 276.
63 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 30 at 288 ("The FTC's leadership used its
2016 249
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Two FACTA sections try to improve the accuracy
of information and give consumers a new right to dis-
pute data included in reports directly with the company
that furnished it." One provides for federal agencies to
promulgate accuracy guidelines for financial institutions
and other creditors that furnish information to credit
bureaus.65 In July 2009, the agencies published the guide-
lines that companies should follow to ensure the accura-
cy and integrity of information they furnish to a credit
reporting agency, ostensibly providing a guide to fur-
nisher FCRA compliance." The other gives consumers the
ability to directly dispute inaccurate information with
furnishers.67 But the FCRA still precludes individual con-
sumers from suing furnishers directly for violations aris-
ing out of their accuracy duties.68 Instead, public regula-
tors monitor compliance with the guidelines.
Despite Congress's attempts to overhaul the FCRA
in 1996 and 2003, inaccuracies continue to plague con-
sumers. In a landmark Congressionally-mandated study,
the FTC concluded that twenty-three percent of consum-
muscle to lobby for permanent preemption of state law. Agency
leaders styled the 2003 amendments as a 'reauthorization' (it
wasn't-the FCRA would continue to exist even if Congress took no
action). In testimony to Congress, its first recommendation-
discussed before identity theft provisions and free consumer report
rights-was to permanently renew preemption.").
64 Though not the focus of this Article, the FACTA amendments also
tried to provide consumers with tools to fight identity theft and re-
store their credit worthiness. FACTA, FACTA §§ 111-115, 151 -157,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, 1681c-1, 1681c-2, 16821g, 1681m,
1681s.
65 FACTA § 312(a), FCRA § 623(e)(1), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(a)(8)(A).
66 See 16 C.F.R. § 660 (Jul. 1, 2009); Regulation V, 12 C.F.R. § 1022.42.
67 FACTA § 312(c), FCRA § 623(a)(8) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(a)(8)(A)).
68 FCRA § 1681s-2(a)(8) gives a consumer the right to directly dispute
inaccurate information but FCRA § 1681s-2(c) bars furnisher liability
for any violations of FCRA § 1681s-2(a), including any regulations
issued thereunder.
250
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ers identified an error on their credit reports.69 Thirteen
percent experienced a change in their credit score as a
result of correcting the error.70 Five percent of the study
participants had errors that, once corrected, improved
their credit score so that they could obtain credit at a
lower price.71 The report suggests that over 10 million
consumers are paying higher rates for credit as a result
of report inaccuracies. 72
FCRA has failed to promote accuracy in consumer
reporting for two principal reasons. First, industry has
never embraced the FCRA's accuracy and fairness man-
dates and acts in numerous ways to undermine them. 73
Second, as explained below, the FCRA's enforcement re-
gime has proved inadequate to protect consumers and
promote accuracy in consumer credit reporting.74 The
failure of FCRA enforcement arises out of a history of
limited public enforcement and a structurally weak pri-
vate right of action, particularly with regard to compa-
nies that furnish information to the credit bureaus .7 The
next section outlines the FCRA enforcement model and
previews the flaws in its design and implementation that
have caused regulatory voids in its enforcement.
III. THE FCRA ENFORCEMENT MODEL
The FCRA enforcement framework is a hybrid
69 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF
THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 (Jan. 2015),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
section- 319-fair-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2 003-sixth-interim-
final-report-federal-trade/150121 factareport.pdf.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 id.
7' HOOFNAGLE, supra note 30 at 275. Hoofnagle explains the myriad
ways the credit reporting industry has undermined the FCRA's fair-
ness and accuracy norms, for instance, by employing an electronic
verification system for reinvestigations that works a form of auto-
mated injustice in that disputed information is never actually inves-
tigated.
74 See Sections III and lV infra.
75 Id.
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model of public and private enforcement.76 Congress has
authorized certain public regulators to enforce the stat-
ute through a mix of regulation and enforcement actions,
and also has authorized private civil litigation by indi-
vidual consumers in a narrow set of circumstances.77
The FCRA's hybrid enforcement model is typical of
many of our laws regulating consumer credit.78 Consum-
er credit regulation in the United States consists of dis-
parate statutes, regulations, and common law at the fed-
eral and state levels. These laws regulate by product
(residential mortgage loan, student loan, payday loan,
and auto finance, credit cards), by stage of the transac-
tion (solicitation, application, origination, servicing, col-
lection), and by concern (access to credit, fair lending,
credit reporting, and debt collection). The result is a de-
centralized "patchwork" of federal and state laws that at-
tempts to protect consumers through a combination of
public enforcement and private rights of action without
any singular or cohesive regulatory framework. 9
76 Public enforcement has been defined as the "use of public agents
. to detect and sanction those who violate the law." A. Mitchell Po-
linsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement
of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45 (2000).
77 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681s for administrative enforcement
and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o for civil liability (i.e. private enforce-
ment).
78 Between 1965 and 1975, Congress passed a number of statutes
designed to protect consumers with respect to financial products
and services, including without limitation the Truth in Lending Act,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1691 et seq., and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et
seq. At the time, Congress acknowledged the need for private en-
forcement mechanisms to supplement public enforcement, so many
of the statutes provided private rights of action not recognized un-
der the common law or with reduced burdens of proof. Congress al-
so provided for public enforcement of these laws.78 Public enforce-
ment was the province of the federal prudential banking regulators
(particularly the Federal Reserve Board) and other federal agencies,
such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
79 Edward Crane et al., U.S. Consumer Protection Law: A Federalist
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There are two explanations for this state of the
law. The first lies with U.S. federalism, which allocates
sovereign powers to both the federal and state govern-
ments.8g Where there are shared powers, the potential for
multiple layers of regulation exists." The second expla-
nation reflects a historical pattern in the development of
consumer protection law in the United States.82 That pat-
tern reveals that consumer protection law evolves only
when government actors respond ex post to a socio-
economic and political crisis, which demands some kind
of regulatory action to prevent recurrence of the cause of
the crisis.83 Recent history supports this latter explana-
tion.
Our collective experience during the global finan-
cial crisis and ensuing recession demonstrates that the
enforcement regimes of these laws were inadequate to
deter undesirable practices related to the extension of
credit and collection of debt. Public regulators failed to
identify, redress, and deter consumer credit abuses until
after they had become systemic and inflicted both micro-
and macro-level economic and social consequences. Pri-
vate lawsuits were slow to expose abuses. Congress re-
sponded to the crisis post hoc by enacting the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act").84 The Dodd-Frank Act
created a new federal agency, the Consumer Financial
Patchwork, 78 DEF. CouNs. J. 305 (Jul. 2011).
80 Id.
81 Id.
81 Waller Brady and Acosta, Consumer Protection in the United States:
An Overview, 2011 EUR. J. CONS. L. 853 (2011).
" Id. ("This pattern began against the background of the 19th centu-
ry common law, which emphasized freedom of contract and caveat
emptor (let the buyer beware). Over time, specific crises and political
events led to both the creation of government bureaucracies with ju-
risdiction over specific products and practices affecting consumers
and a broad array of private rights of actions where consumers can
sue for damages, injunctions, attorney fees, and litigation costs if
they can show harm from the illegal practice.").
84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (July 21, 2010).
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Protection Bureau (the "CFPB"), to strengthen public en-
forcement of consumer credit laws and prevent recur-
rence of the abuses and practices that culminated in the
crisis.85 The Dodd-Frank Act grants the CFPB exclusive or
shared jurisdiction to enforce all or a portion of eighteen
federal consumer financial laws86 and their implementing
regulations.87 Among the goals of the new agency is to
consolidate the enforcement of consumer credit regula-
tions.88
" Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the CFPB as an inde-
pendent agency within the Federal Reserve that has executive agency
status. Dodd-Frank § 1011. The CFPB regulates the offering and
provision of consumer financial products and services under federal
consumer financial laws. Dodd-Frank § 1021. The Bureau seeks to
implement and, where applicable, enforce federal consumer finan-
cial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers
have access to markets for consumer financial products and services
and that market for consumer financial products and services are
fair, transparent and competitive. Id.
86 These laws include all or select portions of the Alternative Mort-
gage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq., the
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 1667 et seq., the Electron-
ic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq., the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1666 et seq., the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
et seq., the Home Owners Protection Act of 1998, 12 U.S.C. § 4901 et
seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831t(c)-(f), the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802-09, the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq., the Home Owner-
ship and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 note, the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq., the S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 5101 et
seq., the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., the Truth in
Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., Section 626 of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, and the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701. See Dodd-Frank Act,
§ 1002(12).
87 These regulations include Regulations B through P as well as Regu-
lations V, X, Z, and DD.
88 The CFPB has two sources of enforcement authority. First, Section
1036 of the Dodd Frank Act imposes general civil liability for viola-
tions of federal consumer financial services laws by covered persons
and entities. The second source of the CFPB's enforcement authority
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Although Congress created the CFPB in an effort to
consolidate public regulation of consumer credit laws,
public enforcement of the FCRA remains extremely
fragmented at the federal level. For example, at least four
federal agencies have some enforcement authority with
respect to FCRA.89 The CFPB, the FTC and other federal
financial agencies including the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, are currently authorized to enforce the FCRA
as to entities over which they have jurisdiction, while the
CFPB also has supervisory authority and primary rule-
making authority as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act.9"
Further, public enforcement of the FCRA historical-
ly has been less than vigorous, perhaps because Con-
gress did not sufficiently empower the FTC to regulate
and enforce the FCRA.9 Post-financial crisis public en-
forcement of the credit reporting system appears to be
more robust.92 For example, the CFPB is more closely po-
licing the practices of credit bureaus and furnishers, but
it is too early to adequately assess the success of its ef-
forts."
Further, Congress's post-financial crisis initiative
largely ignores the private rights of action. The Dodd
Frank Act does not create private rights of action for
consumers or amend existing ones. That said, it does not
preclude existing private rights of action that a consum-
is Section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which broadly empowers the
CFPB to take action to prevent and address "unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts and practices" or UDAAPs. In exercising this authority,
the CFPB may act to enforce regulations it promulgates, pursuant to
Section 1031(b), that declare particular acts or practices to be
UDAAPs, and it may also seek to redress and prevent practices it
deems to be UDAAPs during the course of its enforcement actions.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a).
90 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
1011-12.
91 See Section IV.A. infra.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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er has under federal or state law. This means that the
FCRA's private right of action remains intact, but without
any clarification, improvements, or amendments.
Although the FCRA includes a private right of ac-
tion to enforce some of its substantive provisions against
some of the entities it regulates, the statute also contains
numerous provisions that limit consumers' ability to en-
force those provisions either by expressly precluding in-
dividual suits or by imposing procedural hurdles that are
difficult to satisfy.94 Additionally, complexities and am-
biguities in the statute have given rise to a number of
lower court divisions about the scope of the private right
of action, only further impeding the FCRA's efficacy.95
The divisions are attributable to poor structural design
in the rules that govern the private right of action, such
as standing, preemption, and remedies, among others.
The failure of FCRA enforcement means that the
norms the FCRA seeks to protect, particularly with re-
gard to accuracy of consumers' personal information, are
under-enforced. Mr. Burrell's experience is representative
of many other consumers, who are unable to obtain jus-
tice at an individual level by enforcing the regulated enti-
ties' obligation to maintain accurate information.96 His
experience highlights the imperative for redesigning the
FCRA's enforcement mechanism.
In practice, neither public nor private enforcement
is perfect. Broadly speaking, they share many of the
same goals. Both are policy implementation tools de-
ployed to detect, correct, and deter socially and/or eco-
nomically undesirable conduct. But the mechanisms by
which they achieve those goals are distinct, and the
See Section IV.B infra.
95 Id.
96 Credit Reports: What Accuracy and Errors Means for Consumers,
Prepared Statement of Brenda Faith Campbell Hrg. before the Sub-
comm. On Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance, S.
Hrg. 113-060 (May 7, 2013) (testifying as to her years-long long bat-
tle to obtain justice arising out of errors on her credit report, which
entailed over $17,000 in attorney's fees and costs).
256
(Un)Fair Credit Reporting Act
tradeoffs inherent in the mechanisms are often in oppo-
sition.17 Further, either can result in under- or over-
enforcement of the law. 8 Rather than view these two
types of enforcement as existing in separate spheres of
influence, it is better to regard them as complementary
enforcement mechanisms that support the relevant regu-
latory framework. The goal therefore should be a hybrid
model of enforcement.
But, as our experience with FCRA enforcement in-
dicates, mere use of a hybrid private-public enforcement
model does not guarantee optimal enforcement of the
9' For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of
private and public enforcement, see Burbank, Farhang, & Kritzer, 17
Private Enforcement, LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 637, 661 (2013); Matthew
C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case
for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93,
106 (2005).
98 A fragmented enforcement regime is subject to the dual risks of
under-and over-enforcement. Under-enforcement can arise when
there are numerous uncoordinated regulators who fail to devote re-
sources to monitoring a product, party or market participant be-
cause some or all of them believe incorrectly that the other regulator
is adequately addressing the concern. Over-enforcement can arise
where the numerous regulators, public and private, are simultane-
ously devoting resources to a particular concern leading to multipli-
cative enforcement.
" David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123
YALE L. J. 616, 623 (2013) ("Legal scholarship .. . has moved away
from a binary conception of the choice between public and private
enforcement and is instead exploring their intersections."); Burbank,
Farhang, & Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIs & CLARK L. REv. 637,
661 (2013) ("The choice of private enforcement must be understood
in relation to potential sources of public enforcement .... Public
and private enforcement can be treated as substitutes for one an-
other, or can be used in a complementary fashion. Although public
and private enforcement are sometimes used independently of one a
other, they are also commonly used in combination, with some pow-
ers being delegated to administrative actors, while others are left to
private litigants and courts within the same statute."); J. Maria Glov-
er, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1137 (Mar. 2012) ("Private regulation
through litigation is integral to the structure of the modem adminis-
trative state.").
2016 257
Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 28:2/3
underlying laws. Public and private enforcement must be
strategically designed and deployed to effectively en-
force substantive laws.1°° Policymakers - legislators, regu-
lators, and the judiciary - shape enforcement tools
through legal rules that can encourage or discourage
public and private regulators from enforcing the law.101
As explored below, Congress may deploy a hybrid public-
private enforcement mechanism to enforce a statute like
FCRA with good intentions, but the mechanism may ul-
timately fail in practice to advance the statute's purpose.
IV. THE FAILURE OF FCRA ENFORCEMENT
A. Limited Public Enforcement of the FCRA Caused a
Regulatory Void
An examination of the public enforcement mecha-
nism and regulatory activity before and after Dodd-
Frank's reforms shows that pre-financial crisis public en-
forcement was not sufficiently vigorous to fulfill the
FCRA's goals and caused a regulatory void. Before Dodd-
Frank, the public enforcement mechanism was not ro-
bust for a couple of reasons. First, the FTC lacked the
ability to promulgate rules to regulate business practices
in the credit reporting industry. And second, the FTC's
enforcement activity was minimal.
Congress initially limited the FTC's ability to regu-
late ex ante the business practices of the regulated enti-
'00 Burbank, Farhang, and Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEwis &
CLARK L. REv. 637, 710 (2013); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1137 (Mar. 2012).
101 Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L.
REv. 93, 106 (2005) ("[Tlhe desirability of authorizing private actions
involves difficult policy judgments and is likely to depend on a
number of context-specific factors with the result that making such
determinations therefore requires familiarity with the nature of the
particular policy problem, the substantive goals of the regulatory
scheme, and the likely interaction of private lawsuits with other el-
ements of the government's enforcement strategy").
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ties. As originally passed, the FCRA entrusted primary
enforcement authority of its provisions to the FTC but
prohibited the FTC from issuing regulations.1"2 This
meant that the FTC lacked authority to promulgate rules,
which could have regulated the activities of the credit
bureaus, users, and furnishers to prevent and deter un-
fair practices concerning accuracy in consumer credit re-
ports.
Congress lifted this prohibition in 1999, almost
thirty years later.103 Then Congress amended the FCRA in
2003 to specifically require the FTC to issue regulations
to implement some of its provisions.0 4 As a result of
these amendments, the FTC promulgated regulations
that applied to the credit bureaus, users, and non-bank
furnishers. 105 This furnisher limitation was unfortunate
for consumers and accuracy because it exempted lending
furnishers-i.e., banks- from the purview of FTC regula-
tions.
The FCRA, as originally enacted, did deputize the
FTC with enforcement authority.10 6 Specifically, the FTC
102 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 506(b) (1999)
(striking 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(4)).
103 Id.
104 Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
159 (2003).
105 The FTC withdrew many of its FCRA regulations in April 2012 in
connection with the CFPB's assumption of primary rulemaking au-
thority for the FCRA, and the CFPB republished the rules. See 77
Fed. Reg. 22201 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 320,
321, 322, 603, 60, 611, 613, 614 and 902).
106 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) ("For the purpose of the exercise by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission of its functions and powers under the Feder-
al Trade Commission Act, a violation of any requirement or prohibi-
tion imposed under this subchapter shall constitute an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in commerce, in violation of section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)), and shall be
subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission under sec-
tion 5(b) of that Act [15 U.S.C. § 45 (b)] with respect to any consumer
reporting agency or person that is subject to enforcement by the
Federal Trade Commission pursuant to this subsection, irrespective
of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other
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may seek injunctive and ancillary relief administratively
or through federal district courts. 1°7 Further, the FTC
may file suit in federal court to recover civil penalties of
up to $3,500 per violation, "in the event of a knowing vi-
olation, which constitutes a pattern or practice of viola-
tions." 8 In a federal court action, the FTC also may seek
monetary relief in the form of redress or disgorgement
and other equitable relief.
10 9
Despite its longstanding enforcement authority,
civil enforcement activity during the FTC's pre-financial
crisis tenure was limited. During its forty-year history of
enforcing the FCRA, the FTC brought just 87 enforce-
ment actions against credit bureaus, users of consumer
reports, and furnishers of information to credit bu-
reaus. 10 Because the FCRA originally was focused on
credit bureaus and users, much of the FTC's efforts tar-
geted them, largely omitting furnishers as targets of en-
forcement activity.11 '
jurisdictional tests under the Federal Trade Commission Act.").
107 See id.
1"8 See Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 450 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a))
(the amount set forth in the statute, as enacted in 1996, is $2,500
per knowing violation). Subsequently, pursuant to the Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, the FTC increased the
amount to $3,500 per violation, effective February 9, 2009. See 74
Fed. Reg. 857 (Jan. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1). Courts
consider the degree of culpability, any history of similar conduct,
ability to pay, the effect on ability to continue to do business, and
such other matters as justice may require in calculating any penalty
amount. See Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 450 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1681s(a)).
109 15 U.S.C. § 1681s.
10 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, FORTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH
THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH
INTERPRETATIONS 1 (Jul. 2011), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/40-
years-experience-fair-credit-reporting-act-ftc-staff-report-summary-
interpretations/1 10720fcrareport.pdf.
... See id. at 109-111.
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The FTC's relatively limited enforcement of the
FCRA reflected Congressional priorities. Congress in-
tended that private enforcement be the primary method
of policing the credit reporting industry's compliance
with the FCRA.'12 Likewise, the FTC has embraced Con-
gressional intent that individual consumers play a more
critical role in enforcing the law.113 During the legislative
hearings that culminated in the CCRRA amendments, the
FTC acknowledged that the FCRA "was designed to be
largely self-enforcing" and urged Congress to enact
amendments that would maintain "the capacity of con-
sumers to bring private actions to enforce their rights
under the statute. '114
Second, the limited public enforcement with re-
spect to furnishers reflected the mechanisms provided
for in the statute. There were no duties imposed on fur-
nishers until 1996, 25 years into FCRA enforcement.115
Regulation of furnishers, put simply, was not a priority.
Congress also later curtailed the scope of the FTC's en-
forcement authority with respect to furnisher liability by
limiting the FTC's civil penalty authority.116 Specifically,
in a civil enforcement action, a court may not impose a
civil penalty on a furnisher for failure to provide accu-
rate information to credit bureaus117 unless the furnisher
commits the violation after that court has already issued
an order or injunction prohibiting FCRA violations. 8
Congress's inaction with respect to furnishers over
many years caused a regulatory void. The failure to im-
pose substantial duties on furnishers and to authorize
the public regulators to police compliance with those du-
ties meant that an entire category of credit reporting in-
112 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 11, at § 11.1.
113 S. Rep. No. 103-209, at 6 (1993).
114 Id.
"I Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 ("the CCRRA"),
Pub. L. No. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996)
116 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2)(C).
17 Furnishers must provide accurate information to credit bureaus
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)
118 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2)(C).
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dustry participants was left unregulated. Even after the
FCRA nominally imposed duties on furnishers, it appears
the public regulators did not prioritize enforcement.
Perhaps a dearth of resources among competing agency
concerns kept furnisher compliance from being a priori-
ty. Perhaps FTC regulators believed that the private en-
forcement mechanism was sufficiently effective to moti-
vate FCRA compliance and deter violations. Whatever
the reason, the minimal level of public regulation and en-
forcement vis-A-vis furnishers imposed heavy lifting on
the FCRA's private right of action."'
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the CFPB
and the FTC have committed to more robust public en-
forcement of the FCRA. 20 Both federal regulators have
increased their scrutiny of users and furnishers of con-
sumer information to facilitate more robust public en-
forcement of the FCRA.
The CFPB examines the FCRA's regulated entities
for their compliance with the FCRA's requirements for
handling consumers' credit information within the pur-
view of its supervisory authority.121 The CFPB's increased
attention initially focused on monitoring how credit bu-
reaus satisfied their dispute-handling obligations under
19 See infra Section IV.B.
120 Prepared Remarks by Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, Credit Reporting Field Hearing, Detroit,
Michigan (July 16, 2012) available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-by-
richard-cordray-on-credit-reporting/; Credit Reports: What Accuracy
and Errors Means for Consumers, Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 113' Cong. 113-060 (2013);
The Accuracy and Completeness of Consumer Credit Reports: Hear-
ing before the Subcomm. On Consumer Protection, Product Safety,
and Insurance of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Maneesha Mithal, Associate
Director, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, F.T.C.) ("Vigor-
ous enforcement of the FCRA is a high priority of the Commission.").
121 The CFPB's supervisory authority is provided for in Dodd-Frank
§§ 1024 and 1025, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514-5515.
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the FCRA. 122 And as recently as 2015, the CFPB discov-
ered one or more entities had failed to establish and im-
plement reasonable written policies and procedures re-
garding the accuracy and integrity of information
furnished to CRAs.123
The CFPB signaled its particular focus on furnisher
compliance with bulletins issued in September 2013 and
February 2014, addressing specifically the duty of fur-
nishers to investigate and respond to consumer dis-
putes. 12 4 According to the CFPB, the FCRA requires that
furnishers investigate and respond to the dispute and
consider "all information" relevant to the dispute.1 25 Fur-
ther, the CFPB expressed its concern that creditors did
not have systems and other resources to properly inves-
tigate disputes, and warned creditors that if it found vio-
lations of the FCRA it would "take appropriate supervi-
sory and enforcement actions to address violations and
seek all appropriate corrective measures, including re-
mediation of harm to consumers."1 26 In its February 27,
2014, bulletin, the CFPB states that it "will continue to
monitor furnishers' compliance with the FCRA regarding
consumer disputes of information they have furnished to
122 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights 5
(Winter 2015), available at
http://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/2 01503 _cfpb supervisory-
highlights-winter-2015.pdf; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Supervisory Highlights 5 (Fall 2014), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410-cfpb-supervisory-
highlights-fall-2014.pdf; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Su-
pervisory Highlights 9 (Spring 2014), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201405 cfpb-supervisory-
highlights-spring-20 14.pdf.
123 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights
(Fall 2015), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20151 0cfpb-supervisory-
highlights.pdf.
124 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2013-09
(Sept. 3, 2013); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin
2014-01 (Feb. 27, 2014).
125 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2013-09
(Sept. 3, 2013)
126 Id.
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[consumer reporting agencies], [and] [f]urnishers should
take immediate steps to ensure they are fulfilling their
obligations under the law.
1 27
The FTC has also augmented its efforts to regulate
credit bureaus, users, and furnishers since 2008. With
regard to furnishers, the FTC created the Furnisher Rule,
effective July 1, 2010,128 which prescribes regulations
furnishers must comply with in the event a consumer di-
rectly disputes her credit report information with the
furnisher. In 2013, the FTC brought its first enforcement
action against a furnisher for violations of the Furnisher
Rule, resulting in a $3.5 million settlement-the second
largest penalty in the history of the FTC's FCRA en-
forcement history.129 A 2015 study released by the FTC
found that 23% of the consumers in the study identified
inaccurate information in their credit reports.
130
127 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2014-01
(Feb. 27, 2014).
128 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(e)(1) required the FTC to establish and main-
tain guidelines for furnishers regarding the accuracy and integrity of
information, to prescribe regulations requiring furnishers to estab-
lish reasonable policies and procedures to implement those guide-
lines. The FTC published those regulations, respectively, at 16 C.F.R.
§ 610 and 16 C.F.R. § 660. In July 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act trans-
ferred this rulemaking authority to the CFPB, and the CFPB repub-
lished those regulations at 12 C.F.R. § 1022, respectively at subparts
N and E. The FTC enforces these CFPB regulations with respect to
entities over which the FTC retains jurisdiction under the FCRA.
129 See Complaint, United States v. Certegy Check Servs., Inc., No.
1:13-cv-01247 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2013). Certegy Check Services, Inc.,
one of the nation's largest check authorization service companies,
has agreed to pay $3.5 million to settle Federal Trade Commission
charges that it violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). This is
the first Commission action alleging violations of the Furnisher Rule,
which went into effect on July 1, 2010.
130 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319
OF THE FAIR AND AccuRATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 (Jan.
2015), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/section- 319-
fair-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-sixth-interim-final-report-
federal-trade/i 50121 factareport.pdf.
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Some states have also taken action to fill the regu-
latory void. In March 2015, New York Attorney General
Eric Schneiderman settled a matter requiring the three
nationwide credit bureaus to switch from an automated
verification system to one that actually investigates dis-
putes.' This settlement requires those three credit bu-
reaus to use humans to perform manual reviews of dis-
putes instead of automating the process. 3 2
Macro-level consequences of the increased public
oversight in this area remain to be assessed as of the
writing of this Article. The reality is that for more than
four decades, the vast majority of the FCRA's existence, a
relatively thin public enforcement mechanism created a
regulatory void that Congress ostensibly filled with a
private right of action. The next section describes and
deconstructs the structure of the private right of action
to illuminate the flaws in its design.
B. Flawed Private Right of Action Impairs Individual
Access to Justice
Congress included a private enforcement mecha-
nism in the FCRA in acknowledgement that a consumer's
interest in accuracy and privacy of her financial and oth-
er personal information is important. The FCRA express-
ly deputizes individuals with authority to enforce some
of its requirements against some of its regulated enti-
ties. 33
Specifically, a consumer has a private right of ac-
tion against any person-credit bureaus, users, and fur-
nishers-for negligent violations of the FCRA.134 A pre-
13' HOOFNAGLE, supra note 30 at 280 (discussing In the Matter of In-
vestigation by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of
New York of Experian Information Solutions, Inc.; Equifax Information
Services, LLC; and TransUnion LLC (Mar. 2015)).
132 Id.
113 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. Before the 1996 amendments, sec-
tions 1681n and o provided for suit against a CRA or against a user
of credit information, but not against a furnisher.
134 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.
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vailing consumer is entitled to any actual damages sus-
tained as a result of the negligent noncompliance plus
the costs of the action and reasonable attorney's fees. 35
A consumer also has a private right of action
against any person for a willful violation of the FCRA. 136 A
prevailing consumer is entitled to any actual damages
sustained by the consumer as a result of the willful non-
compliance, or statutory damages of not-less than $100
and not more than $1,000, whichever is greater, plus pu-
nitive damages as the court may allow, together with
costs of the action plus reasonable attorney's fees. 37
These provisions appear straightforward enough in
terms of the structural design of FCRA's private en-
forcement mechanism. The complexities and weaknesses
in the structural design of the FCRA private right of ac-
tion arise for other reasons.
First, Congress limited the scope of the private
right of action in a number of ways in response to indus-
try pressures. The FCRA precludes furnishers from pri-
vate litigation liability for violating the FCRA except
where a furnisher has failed to comply with the statutory
reinvestigation procedure.'38 The statute appears to ex-
empt users from all private litigation liability as well.'3 9
That leaves the credit bureaus subject to the greatest ex-
posure for liability by private litigants. 40 In short, the
statute's extensive liability exemptions for users and
furnishers-who often overlap-mean the FCRA's private
enforcement mechanism has enormous gaps.
135 Id.
136 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
137 Id.
138 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2b; see also infra Section IV.B.1.
139 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m.
140 The FCRA provides for private right of action against credit bu-
reaus in two respects, both based on inaccuracy claims: (1) 1681e(b)
claim failure to maintain reasonable procedures to maintain maxi-
mum possible accuracy of the information contained in consumer
reports; and (2) 1681i claim to dispute the accuracy or completeness
of information in her file.
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Second, the judiciary has curtailed consumers' in-
centives to privately enforce the FCRA through its inter-
pretations of the statute. Gaps in the structural design
of FCRA's private enforcement mechanism have led to
divided decisional law interpreting the statutes, resulting
also in under-enforcement of the FCRA.14 1 With regard to
FCRA, such gaps include-without limitation-identifying
who has standing to assert a claim, articulating pleading
standards to properly state a claim, specifying when
FCRA preempts state law causes of action against regu-
lated entities, interpreting fee- and cost-shifting rules,
among others.
The remainder of this paper examines several of
the more prominent flaws in FCRA's private right of ac-
tion, including its extensive liability exemptions for the
entities it purports to regulate. By illustrating the flaws
in the structural design of the private right of action, the
paper provides a blueprint for considerations and guide-
lines lawmakers may use to amend the FCRA's enforce-
ment mechanism.
1. Exemptions from private litigation liability for
furnishers and users creates another regulatory void
The FCRA did not impose any duties on the fur-
nishers of information to credit bureaus until Congress
enacted the CCRRA in 1996.142 These duties, codified in
Section 1681s-2, require that furnishers provide "accu-
rate information" to credit reporting agencies,1 43 and re-
investigate information disputed by a consumer after re-
ceiving notification of the dispute from a credit
bureau.144 The CCRRA also expanded the civil liability
sections of the FCRA to permit a private right of action
against any person-as opposed to just credit bureaus
141 Further, many of these same issues arise under other statutes
that regulate consumer credit and otherwise protect consumers,
such the TCPA and the FDCPA, as noted below.
142 CCRRA, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2.
143 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).
144 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
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and users-who willfully or negligently violates the stat-
ute. 145  This latter amendment superficially makes fur-
nishers subject to private litigation liability.
However, there is currently no private remedy un-
der the FCRA for many furnisher violations. Subsection
1681s-2(a) imposes affirmative duties on furnishers to
provide accurate information to credit bureaus, but sub-
sections 1681s-2(c) and (d) exempt furnishers from pri-
vate litigation liability for violations of those duties. 146
Subsection (c) expressly provides that the FCRA's private
right of action, articulated in Sections 1681n and o, does not
apply to a furnisher's failure to comply with the accuracy
duties enumerated in subsection (a).147 Subsection (d)
provides that only public regulators have the ability to
enforce furnishers' Section 1681s-2(a) accuracy duties.148
Consequently, the FCRA precludes private enforcement
of most of the duties imposed on furnishers to protect
consumers.
FCRA Section 1681s-2(b) does provide a narrow
private right of action to enforce a furnisher's reinvesti-
gation obligations in response to a credit reporting agen-
cy's request relating to a consumer's dispute that origi-
nates with the credit bureau.149 But this too has been the
subject of dispute among courts. 5 ° In this context, a
consumer must first dispute the accuracy of information
145 SeePub.L. 104-208 at § 2412; 110 Stat. 3009 at § 2412 (1996)
("section 616 of the [FCRA] ... is amended by striking 'Any consum-
er reporting agency or user of information which' and inserting '(a)
IN GENERAL, any person who' ").
146 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2.
147 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) (FCRA sections 1681n and o "do not apply
to any failure to comply with subsection (a) of this section.").
148 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(d) (Furnishers' accuracy duties "shall be en-
forced exclusively under section 1681s of this title by the Federal
agencies and officials and the State officials identified in that sec-
tion.").
149 See 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2 (b).
"So See e.g., Davis v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 2009 WL 2525303, at 3 (N.D. Tex.
2009) (some courts have concluded that there is no private right of
action at all against furnishers).
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on her credit report with the credit reporting agency and
then rely on the credit bureau to notify the furnisher of
the dispute. 5' A furnisher need not honor a dispute re-
ceived directly from the consumer, whether oral or writ-
ten, under the FCRA. 5 ' Even in the face of this proce-
dural hurdle, which is difficult to identify within the
statute, a consumer does not have a cause of action
against the furnisher for reporting inaccurate infor-
mation-only a cause of action to enforce the furnisher's
role in the reinvestigation procedure designed to resolve
a consumers' allegation of inaccuracy. 53
Such a narrowly drawn private right of action
against furnishers created another regulatory void. Mr.
Burrell, introduced earlier in this Article, is an oft-cited
example of the gap in the FCRA's private right of action.
He contacted the furnisher directly about the inaccurate,
negative information on his credit report, and when un-
successful, he sued the furnishers directly for noncom-
pliance with the FCRA.'54 The court reluctantly informed
Mr. Burrell that the FCRA requires a consumer to contact
the credit reporting agencies to dispute information on
his credit report.15 That dispute would then trigger the
statute's reinvestigation procedure that involves the fur-
nishers. 5 6 If the furnishers failed to fulfill their duties in
connection with the reinvestigation, Mr. Burrell could sue
them for noncompliance with the FCRA reinvestigation
151 A furnisher's § 1681s-2(b) duties arise only after a furnisher re-
ceives notice of dispute from a credit bureau. Notice of a dispute to
a furnisher by a consumer directly does not trigger a furnisher's du-
ty to reinvestigate under section 1681s-2(b). See id. ("While a fur-
nisher of information may have liability for violations of 1681s-2(b),
it is clear that any liability for alleged violation of 1681s-2(b) does
not arise until a consumer reporting agency reports an inaccuracy to
the furnisher and the furnisher fails to correct the error.").
152 See id.
153 After the credit bureau receives a notice of dispute from a con-
sumer, the credit bureau, must then obtain verification of the dis-
puted information from the furnisher in accordance with FCRA §
1681i.
154 See Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 444-49.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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duties.'57
Consumers' inability to privately enforce furnish-
ers' duty to maintain accurate information diminishes
furnishers' motivation to maintain accuracy and to cor-
rect inaccurate information. The matter is left entirely to
public enforcement. What could possibly be the rationale
to support such a rule?
The legislative history is clear that Congress in-
tended to protect furnishers from consumer lawsuits
arising out of inaccuracies, preferring instead to reserve
enforcement authority for federal and state agencies.'58
The House Report articulates opposition to even a mod-
est addition of privately enforceable duties for furnish-
ers because of the potential risks of increased costs and
unnecessary litigation.'59 This suggests that the weak
furnisher duties imposed by the CCRRA are borne of
Congress's desire to legislate something rather than
nothing to address inaccuracies in consumer credit re-
porting rather than a desire to provide meaningful reme-
dial relief for consumers dealing with credit report inac-
curacies.
The Ninth Circuit also has examined Congress's
reasons for gap in furnisher liability. 160 It explained that
"Congress did not want furnishers of credit exposed to
suit by any and every consumer dissatisfied with the
credit information furnished.', 61 Consequently, legisla-
tors decided that a furnisher's accuracy duties should be
157 Id.
158 H.R. Rep. 103-486 (1994) ("[Section 1681s-2(a)] bars private citi-
zens from bringing suit against furnishers of information for viola-
tions of certain duties imposed on them").
159 Id. ("[Wie are concerned that the bill may foster unnecessary liti-
gation. The bill establishes a series of new duties for furnishers of
credit information that may increase costs through litigation or oth-
erwise prove counterproductive.").
160 Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mtg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th
Cir. 2002) (upholding the viability of a private right of action under
section 1681s-2(b)).
161 Id.
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enforceable only by federal or state government agen-
cies.'62 Although the Ninth Circuit noted that "[tihe stat-
ute has been drawn with extreme care, reflecting the tug
of the competing interests" of consumers, credit bu-
reaus, and furnishers and users of credit information,
such an insubstantial enforcement mechanism leads to
speculation that Congress failed to use due care.163
Congress has similarly exempted users from the
FCRA's private enforcement mechanism, creating yet an-
other regulatory void. FCRA Section 1681m requires us-
ers of consumer reports to provide certain notices to
consumers. 16 These notices include notices of adverse
actions based on consumer reports, among others.
1 65
Specifically, users are required to notify consumers when
the report leads the user to offer the consumer credit on
materially less favorable terms than the best available to
others.166
The FCRA's private right of action against users of
consumer credit reports is similarly superficial. The
FCRA nominally imposes a number of duties on users of
consumer credit reports in Section 1681m.1 67 But Con-
gress eliminated private enforcement of these duties
with the FACTA.1  The FACTA added a subsection to
Section 1681m that appears to exempt all of Section
1681m's requirements from private enforcement. 169
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 15 U.S.C. § 1681m.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 FACTA § 311 added subsection (h) to FCRA § 1681m so as to
eliminate private rights of action for violations of § 1681m. IS U.S.C.
§ 1681m(h)(8) "Enforcement" provides that: "Sections 1681n and
1681 of this title shall not apply to any failure by any person to
comply with this section," and that "this section shall be enforced
exclusively under section 1681s of this title by the Federal agencies
and officials identified in that section." 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (h)(8)(A)-
(B).
169 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(A). ("Sections 1681n and 1681o of this
title shall not apply to any failure by any person to comply with this
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Some courts attribute the defect to inadvertent drafting
error.17 ° These courts speculate that Congress inadvert-
ently eliminated the private right of action due to a draft-
ing error, and intended that the liability exemption apply
only to the new subsection, not to all of Section
1681m.171 But many courts adhere to the plain language
of the statute and conclude, to the detriment of consum-
ers, that the amendment unambiguously eliminates a
private right of action to enforce the entire section
against users.72
Thus, Congress has substantially eliminated pri-
vate litigation liability for two of the three types of enti-
ties FCRA regulates-furnishers and users. The resulting
private enforcement regime is alarmingly flimsy when
one considers the primary purpose of the FCRA: ensur-
ing fairness and accuracy of consumer information con-
tained in consumer credit reports.
section.") (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(B)
("This section shall be enforced exclusively under section 1681s of
this title by the Federal agencies and officials identified in that sec-
tion").
170 See, e.g., Barnette v. Brook Rd., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 741, 749 (E.D.
Va. 2006).
171 Id. ("the limitation in § 1681m(h)(8) should read 'subsection' ra-
ther than 'section,' thereby applying solely to subsection (h) and not
eliminating the private right of action for violations of the remainder
of § 1681m").
172 See e.g. Perry v. First Nat. Bank, 459 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2006), reh'g
denied (FACTA amendment that eliminates a private right of action
for violations of user disclosure requirements applies to all of sec-
tion 1681m, rather than only to specific subsection under which
amendment was listed). See also Soroka v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.,
500 F. Supp. 2d 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). ("The unambiguous plain
language of the FCRA makes it clear that Congress intended for this
section to be enforced only by federal administrative agencies.");
Shellman v. Country Wide Home Loans, Inc., 2006 WL 1544427 (N.D.
Ind. 2006); Murray v. Cross Country Bank, 399 F. Supp. 2d 843
(N.D. I1. 2005); Bonner v. Home123 Corp., 2006 WL 1518974 (N.D.
Ind. 2006); Bruce v. Grieger's Motor Sales, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 988
(N.D. Ind. 2006); Putkowski v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 423 F. Supp.
2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Stavroff v. Gurley Leep Dodge, Inc., 413
F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Ind. 2006); Villagran v. Freeway Ford, Ltd.,
2006 WL 964731 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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2. Circuit-level split concerning standing has eliminated
the FCRA private right of action in some jurisdictions
A catalog of the weaknesses in the FCRA's private
enforcement mechanism should include its ambiguity
about who has standing to enforce the statute. For ex-
ample, under the current liability scheme, the FCRA's
statutory cause of action for willful violations does not
clearly require a showing of actual harm.173 A consumer
plaintiff who pleads a willful FCRA violation may obtain
damages for actual harm as well as statutory damages
ranging from $100 to $1,000 and punitive damages. 174 As
written, it appears a plaintiff is entitled to statutory
damages for technical violations of the statute even if
she has not suffered any actual damages.175
As a result, the federal judiciary is divided about
whether a bare violation of the statute, without demon-
strable actual harm, is sufficient to confer constitutional
standing on a plaintiff to enforce the statute.
The Second and Fourth Circuits have ruled that while a
technical violation satisfies statutory standing, a FCRA
plaintiff must demonstrate actual injury-in-fact, or more
concrete harm, to satisfy constitutional standing re-
quirements.'76  The Ninth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits have found no injury-in-fact is needed to
confer constitutional standing where statutory damages
are recoverable, the statutory violation is a sufficiently
concrete injury to the plaintiff to satisfy constitutional
standing requirements." The U.S. Supreme Court has en-
173 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006) ("Any person who willfully fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with
respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount
equal to . . . damages of not less than $100 and not more than
$1,000.").
174 Id.
171 See id.
176 Kendall v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112 (2d Cir.
2009); David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2013) (allowing unin-
jured plaintiffs to sue "conflates statutory standing with constitu-
tional standing").
177 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412-14 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
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tertained this question recently in Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.
but has not yet resolved it.178
The Supreme Court's Spokeo decision will have
consequences for consumers' ability to sue to enforce
the FCRA and other consumer protection measures, such
as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Truth in
Lending Act (the "TILA"), the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act (the "EFTA"), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(the "FDCPA"), and the Fair Housing Act (the "FHA"),
among others.179 All of these statutes permit plaintiffs to
recover statutory damages where actual damages for vio-
lations are often difficult to prove or nonexistent. For
example, consumers suing under the TWLA can seek up to
$1,000 per statutory violation while those suing for
FDCPA violations can obtain a maximum of $1,000 in
statutory damages. 180
granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015); Hammerv. Sam's East, Inc., 754 F.3d
492, 499-500 (8th Cir. 2014); Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs, 579 F.3d
702 (6th Cir. 2009); Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th
Cir. 2006).
17 Spokeo, supra note 154, at 412-14. Spokeo involves a suit under
the FCRA by Thomas Robins, an individual, who alleges that Spokeo,
Inc., an online "people search engine" published inaccurate infor-
mation about him. Id. at 410. Spokeo aggregates this information
from publicly available data and does not verify the accuracy of the
information it provides. FCRA limits the circumstances in which
consumer reporting agencies may provide "consumer report[s] for
employment purposes," 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1) (2006). and requires
such agencies to "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy of" consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). The
case focuses on whether Robins was actually harmed when Spokeo
published the inaccurate information. Spokeo, supra note 154, at
412. Robins alleges that the bare violation of the FCRA is sufficient
injury to satisfy constitutional standing requirements. Id. at 411-12.
Robins claimed the inaccurate information in Spokeo's search re-
sults actually harmed his employment prospects, which cost him
money. Id. at 411. Spokeo counters that an FCRA plaintiff should
have to show some concrete harm. Id. at 412.
"9 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 1692k(a)
(2006).
"' See 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a).
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Congress likely intentionally structured the FCRA's
statutory cause of action-and many others-in order to
further its fairness and accuracy norms. The ability to
recover for statutory violations even in the absence of
actual damages is meant to deter credit bureaus, users,
and furnishers from engaging in unlawful conduct and
promotes their compliance with the statute. If consum-
ers cannot rely on the penalties set out in these statutes
designed to protect consumers, it will be harder for con-
sumers to enforce the statutes' substantive obligations
against companies.
3. Conflicting decisional law concerning
interpretation of the preemption rules
The FCRA has ambiguous preemption provisions
that further diminish the strength of its private enforce-
ment mechanism. The statutory ambiguities have given
rise to divisive decisional law, with the result that con-
sumers lack predictability about whether they have a
federal or state private remedy, or any at all. 181
As originally enacted, the FCRA contained a "limi-
tation of liability" provision, Section 1681h(e), and a
general preemption provision, section 1681t. Section
1681h(e) grants credit bureaus, users, and furnishers a
qualified immunity from certain state law tort claims.182
181 The judicial policymaking that results from private litigation gen-
erates concerns about unpredictability and inconsistency among in-
dividual litigants, thereby negatively affecting their incentives to sue.
That said, conflicting decisional law may have some value. See Bur-
bank, Farhang and Kritzer, supra note 81 at 664 ("As distinguished
from the imposition of a policy solution at the top of a centralized
and hierarchical bureaucracy, litigation of an issue among many par-
ties and interests, and across many judicial jurisdictions, can lead to
a multiplicity of policy responses to a problem, and successful poli-
cy solutions will gain traction and spread.").
182 Fair Credit Reporting Act § 610, codified at § 1681h(e) ("No con-
sumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defama-
tion, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting
of information against any consumer reporting agency, any user of
information, or any person who furnishes information to a consum-
er reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant to
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It eliminates defamation, invasion of privacy, and negli-
gence actions except as "to false information furnished
with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer." '183
While clear on its face, the qualified immunity provision
has generated confusion and division in implementation
as the federal judiciary has tried to interpret it in con-junction with Section 1681t, the FCRA's preemption pro-
vision.
Section 1681t had limited preemptive force in its
original form. It preempted state laws only where incon-
sistent with the FCRA.1 14 The CCRRA, however, expanded
FCRA's preemptive force with respect to furnishers. 85
Specifically, subsection 1681t(b)(1)(F) appears to preempt
all state statutory and common law claims with regard to
furnisher duties to provide accurate information and re-
investigate disputed information.86
District courts are divided about how to reconcile
these two provisions with respect to furnisher liability
for state law claims under the FCRA. Congress did not
specifically provide in the CCRRA that Section 1681t su-
persedes 1681h. Congress has not repealed or revoked
Section 1681h. And the legislative history is silent con-
cerning reconciliation of the two provisions.
Without a clear manifestation of Congressional in-
tent, courts have tried to discern its unexpressed intent
and interpret the two provisions in a way to honor the
purposes of the FCRA. However, three distinct ap-
proaches have emerged among the courts-total, tem-
section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, except as to false in-
formation furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such con-
sumer.").
183 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
184 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1970).
185 U.S.C. § 1681t (1996).
186 It provides: "[n]o requirement or prohibition may be imposed un-
der the laws of any State-with respect to any subject matter regu-
lated under section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibili-
ties of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting
agencies." 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F).
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poral, and statutory-to reconcile these two provisions.
The "total" approach takes the view that subsec-
tion 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts all state law causes of action
against furnishers, whether based in statute or common
law. 187 Courts adopting this approach have concluded
that the adoption of subsection 1681t(b)(1)(F) constitutes
an implied revocation of the limited liability granted un-
der Section 1681h(e).188
The "temporal approach" tries to reconcile the
conflict between the two preemption sections based on
the time period to which the state law claim relates.189 It
holds that subsection 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts state law
claims that arise after the furnisher receives a notice of
dispute concerning the accuracy of information reported
while Section 1681h(e) applies to claims that arise before
the furnisher receives notice.190
Finally, the "statutory" approach tries to harmo-
nize the provisions by concluding that Section
1681t(b)(1) preempts only state statutory claims while
Section 1681h(e) applies only to state common law
claims. 9 '
187 See, e.g., Campbell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 2005 WL
1514221 (D.N.J. 2005), order amended on reconsideration, 2005 WL
1924669 (D.N.J. 2005); Purcell v. Universal Bank, N.A., 2003 WL
1962376 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Jaramillo v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 356 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Gordon v. Greenpoint Cred-
it, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (S.D. Iowa 2003).
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., Aklagi v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d
1186, 1193-96 (D. Kan. 2002).
190 See, e.g., Vazquez-Garcia v. Trans Union De Puerto Rico, 222 F.
Supp. 2d 150 (D.P.R. 2002); Ryder v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 371
F. Supp. 2d 152 (D. Conn. 2005); Malm v. Household Bank (SB), N.A.,
2004 WL 1559370 (D. Minn. 2004); Bank One, N.A. v. Colley, 294 F.
Supp. 2d 864 (M.D. La. 2003); Aklagi, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1193-96.
191 See,e.g., Watson v. Trans Union Credit Bureau, 2005 WL 995687
(D. Me. 2005); DiPrinzio v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL
2039175 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Barnhill v. Bank of America, N.A., 378 F.
Supp. 2d 696 (D.S.C. 2005); Jeffery v. Trans Union, LLC, 273 F. Supp.
2d 725 (E.D. Va. 2003); Carlson v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d
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There are arguments that discredit each of the ap-
proaches. For example, the total approach renders Sec-
tion 1681h(e) a nullity while the temporal and statutory
approaches do not.192 The temporal approach and the to-
tal approach run afoul of the canon of statutory con-
struction which calls for the more specific provision to
prevail over the more general one. 193 Under the statutory
approach, the more specific provision-the limitation of
liability provision in Section 1681h(e)-is unaffected by
interpreting the more general provision- Section 1681t-
to apply only to state statutory laws.194
The point is that in the absence of clear preemp-
tion rules from Congress, the judiciary is left to structure
and implement the rules that will apply to private liti-
gants. In the context of FCRA enforcement, preemption
fissures abound among and within districts. And those
fissures render FCRA an empty shell. Consumers are left
without federal or state recourse to enforce the FCRA be-
cause the preemption rules as drafted and implemented
bar the way.
4. Conflicting decisional law concerning the availability
of equitable remedies
The judiciary also disagrees about the scope and
availability of remedies permitted by FCRA. Among the
disputed issues is whether the FCRA permits a private
517 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Nelski v. Ameritech, 2004 WL 1460001 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, 704 N.W.2d 700 (Mich. 2005); Gordon,
266 F. Supp. 2d 1007; Reed v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Minn. 2004); Yutesler v. Sears Roebuck and
Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Minn. 2003); Gorman v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, LLP, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Cisneros v.
Trans Union, LLC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Haw. 2003); McCloud v.
Homeside Lending, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D. Ala. 2004); Jordan v.
Trans Union LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Johnson v.
Citimortgage, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
192 Barnhill v. Bank of America, N.A., 378. F. Sup. 2d 696 (D.S.C.
2005).
193 Id.
194 Id.
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plaintiff to obtain equitable relief such as an injunction
precluding the reporting of inaccurate information or a
declaratory judgment that information reported is inac-
curate.'95 While Sections 1681n and 1681o provide for
monetary relief for private litigants, they are silent re-
garding availability of any kind of equitable relief. 96 In
contrast, Section 1681s expressly provides for injunctive
relief in government enforcement actions.197 And, as with
preemption rules, the courts have tried to divine Con-
gressional intent concerning the availability of equitable
remedies for private FCRA litigants against a dearth of
legislative history. The result is conflicting decisional
law. 198
One view is that the plain language of the FCRA
authorizes only government agencies to obtain equitable
relief in a FCRA action.199 These courts compare Con-
gress's omission of equitable remedies in the private
195 Washington v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc, 199 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding that the Court lacked the power to grant a private lit-
igant's request for injunctive relief under the FCRA); White v. First
American Registry, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding
the same); Bumgardner v. Lite Cellular, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 525, 526-
27 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding the same); Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., 973
F.Supp. 1320, 1338 (D. Utah 1997) (holding the same); Mangio v.
Equifax, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 283, 284-85 (S.D. Fla.1995) (holding the
same); Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64 F.R.D. 660, 668 (W.D.
Pa.1974) (holding the same). But see Engelbrecht v. Experian Info.
Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 10424896, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that
injunctive relief is available to private litigants for violations of the
FCRA); Murray v. E*Trade Financial Corp., 2006 WL 2054381 (N.D.
Ill. 2006) (holding the same).
196 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
197 15 U.S.C. § 1681s.
198 Some courts have expressed disagreement with this view without
ruling on this issue. See, e.g., Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579
F.3d 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2009) (expressing doubt that Congress's fail-
ure to expressly provide for injunctive relief for private plaintiffs
means that a court cannot grant it); Valentine v. First Advantage Saf-
erent, Inc., 2009 WL 4349694 at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (recognizing the
split of authority and declining to address the issue); Andrews v.
Trans Union Corp. Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(finding injunctive relief available), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 225
F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 534 U.S. 19 (2000).
199 See sources cited supra note 171.
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right of action with its explicit authorization of injunc-
tive relief in government enforcement actions, and con-
clude that Congress intentionally limited the judiciary's
equitable authority with respect to private FCRA liti-
gants.2 ° This interpretation is based on the tenet that
Congress is presumed to act intentionally and purposely
when it includes language in one section but omits it in
another.2"'
The contrasting view holds that a court may invoke
its equitable powers and order injunctive or declaratory
relief whenever appropriate unless Congress gives a
"clear command" that such authority is prohibited. °2
These courts conclude that where Congress does not ex-
pressly enjoin equitable relief, injunctions and declarato-
ry judgments are among the range of permissible reme-
dies for FCRA plaintiffs.20 3  Accordingly, plaintiffs may
seek, for example, an injunction which would bar the re-
porting of inaccurate information.
The unavailability of equitable relief for private
FCRA plaintiffs harms consumers and undermines accu-
racy in consumer credit reporting, thereby subverting the
statute's purpose. Without equitable relief, a plaintiff
cannot obtain a court order mandating the correction of
inaccurate credit report information. She cannot obtain
an injunction which would stop the reporting or furnish-
ing of inaccurate information. The exclusion of equitable
204 mitirelief also precludes certain class actions. To maintain
200 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o and 15 U.S.C. § 1681s.
201 See Washington, 199 F.3d at 268-69.
202 Engelbrecht, 2012 WL 10424896, at *4-5 (finding that injunctive
relief is available to private litigants for violations of the FCRA);
Murray, 2006 WL 2054381 (injunctive relief is available remedy for
private litigants under FCRA because Congress did not specifically
enjoin equitable relief).
203 See Engelbrecht, 2012 WL 10424896, at *4-5; Murray, 2006 WL
2054381.
204 See, e.g., Washington, 199 F.3d 263 (FCRA does not allow private
litigants to obtain injunctive relief and accordingly, class certifica-
tion was not proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)); cf. Murray v.
GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006) (implying that a
FCRA class action in which plaintiffs recover damages and/or an in-
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a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, plaintiffs must show that the "predomi-
nant relief sought is injunctive or declaratory."2" Without
equitable relief, private FCRA plaintiffs cannot aggregate
their claims where their common goal is the correction
or removal of inaccurate credit report information.
This section has examined only some of these
flaws in FCRA's private right of action against a back-
drop of limited public enforcement activity. Nonethe-
less, this limited illustration highlights the imperative for
structural reform of the FCRA's enforcement mecha-
nisms to more effectively promote accuracy in consumer
credit reporting.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE FCRA
ENFORCEMENT REGIME
This Article recommends that Congress retain the
FCRA's hybrid public-private enforcement model but re-
structure the mechanisms in two ways. First, Congress
should more effectively calibrate the roles, responsibili-
ties, and actions of the public regulator(s)-the CFPB and
the FTC-with the ability of individuals to enforce the
FRCA as private regulators. Second, inherent to the first
recommendation, Congress should restructure the pri-
vate right of action so that the rules that govern con-
sumer access to the courts are clearer and more deliber-
ately designed to effectuate the statute's accuracy norm.
With regard to calibrating the relative roles of the
public and private litigator, Congress should consider
whether any of the FCRA's substantive obligations are
better-suited to policing by a public regulator, such as
the CFPB and the FTC.2"6 Evaluating when to deploy pub-
junction would be permissible).
205 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
206 See generally Glover, supra note 73. Glover has proffered a con-
ceptual framework for ascertaining whether and in what circum-
stances private enforcement mechanisms should be integrated into a
regulatory scheme. "[Tihe goal is to provide elements of a frame-
2016 281
Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 28:2/3
lic enforcement necessarily entails examining whether
and in what circumstances a private right of action
should be integrated into the enforcement regime.0 7 Ac-
cordingly, Congress should also consider whether to ex-
clude a private enforcement mechanism or to deploy pri-
vate litigation as a supplementary or primary
regulator."'
Once Congress decides to integrate a private right
of action into the FCRA's enforcement model, whether as
an adjunct or primary regulator, it must entertain a se-
cond set of considerations, namely the specific rules that
should govern the private right of action, such as stand-
ing, preemption, and remedies to name just a few. To de-
sign optimally effective rules, Congress should consider
and weigh the potential rules against a number of gen-
eral factors, such as the goals and purpose of the statute
and the role of the public regulator.
The remainder of this Article charts a path for
Congress to restructure the FCRA's enforcement mecha-
nism. It does so by suggesting considerations or criteria
that should influence what the revised enforcement re-
gime looks like. Many of these considerations and crite-
ria are not discernable in the FCRA's relatively bare legis-
lative history, so it is difficult to ascertain whether they
influenced the current enforcement regime. That said,
Congress's historically piecemeal and reactive approach
to legislating in the consumer credit space suggests Con-
gress was not as thoughtful about structuring an opti-
mally effective public-private enforcement regime as it
could have been.
A. Calibrating the FCRA's Public and Private Enforcement
Mechanisms
To calibrate the public and private enforcement
work for thinking more systematically about how to calibrate and
design appropriate mechanisms of private enforcement within the
contours of a given regulatory scheme." Id. at 1178-79.
207 Id. at 1177.
208 Id.
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mechanisms in the FCRA, Congress should delineate
those aspects of the statute that the relevant agencies
will police through rulemaking, supervisory, and en-
forcement authority. In conjunction with such a decision,
Congress should determine whether and in what circum-
stances to integrate a private right of action to enforce
some of the law's provisions.
As discussed, Congress carved out the bulk of fur-
nisher liability from the statute's private right of action.
Public regulation of furnisher compliance was inade-
quate and caused a regulatory void. This led to under-
enforcement of furnishers' duty to provide accurate in-
formation to credit bureaus. Accordingly, the question of
the appropriate level of potential furnisher liability pre-
sents an opportunity to discuss how to calibrate the
FCRA's public and private enforcement mechanisms.
One obvious way to calibrate the enforcement
mechanism is to amend the statute to give individual
consumers a private right of action to remedy a furnish-
er's violation of its duties to provide accurate infor-
mation.210 Indeed it makes sense to integrate a private
right of action with a public enforcement regime where,
as here, public regulators have historically under-
enforced a particular law.211
Until recently, this factor would have favored
amending the FCRA to permit a private right of action
against furnishers. It is true that the global financial cri-
sis exemplifies failure in consumer credit regulation, and
that failure arguably supports the need for private litiga-
tion to fill the regulatory voids in many areas, including
fair credit reporting. That said, public enforcement of the
209 Burbank, et al., supra, note 73, at 672; see also Stephen B Burbank,
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1543,
1547 (2014).
210 Jeffrey Bils, Fighting Unfair Credit Reports: A Proposal to Give
Consumers More Power to Enforce the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61
UCLA L. REV. Disc. 226 (2013).
211 Glover, supra note 73, at 1204-17.
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FCRA has been amplified in the wake of the crisis.212 For
example, Congress delegated to the CFPB, the agency
with relevant FCRA expertise, authority to consider
whether and when a furnisher has a duty to reinvestigate
a consumer's allegation of inaccuracy based on a direct
request from the consumer.213 Additionally, the CFPB has
authority to supervise and examine regulated entities for
compliance with the FCRA-an ex ante method of detect-
ing and prohibiting violations-which may prove more
effective to realizing the statute's goals than ex post en-
forcement powers and private litigation.214 Against this
backdrop of relatively more robust public enforcement,
lawmakers may conclude legitimately that creating a pri-
vate right of action against furnishers is unnecessary,
having closed the regulatory void. 215
However, the increased attention by public regula-
tors should not eliminate the viability of a private right
of action against furnishers. Private regulation remains
212 See supra Section IV.A.
213 The Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the FCRA have tasked the
CFPB with promulgating regulations which govern circumstances
under which a furnisher shall be required to reinvestigate a dispute
concerning the accuracy of information contained in a consumer re-
port on the consumer, based on a direct request from a consumer
rather than a request from a credit bureau. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2a(8) ("The [CFPB] shall prescribe regulations that shall identify the
circumstances under which a furnisher shall be required to reinves-
tigate a dispute concerning the accuracy of information contained in
a consumer report on the consumer, based on a direct request of a
consumer.").
214 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 30, at 275.
215 Burbank, et al., supra note 73, at 661 ("[Tjhe choice of private en-
forcement must be understood in relation to potential sources of
public enforcement."). This decision should be made in relation to
the availability of public enforcement mechanisms and other mar-
ket-based incentives that motivate the regulated entities to comply
with the law. Likewise, where Congress decides, for whatever rea-
son, to exempt certain entities or substantive provisions from indi-
vidual consumer liability, it should consider whether there is a pub-
lic regulator policing market behavior and business practices or
other market-based deterrents.
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an effective supplement to public regulation.2 16 This is
particularly true where the relevant law would benefit
from a private right of action as a "failsafe" mechanism
that functions as a supplementary rather than primary
regulator.217 In this context, the private right of action
aims to deter and remedy harm that ex ante regulation
does not prevent, whether as a result of gaps in the pub-
lic enforcement mechanism or to ensure regulation of
harmful practices that a public regulator may not be able
to anticipate.1 8
This may be the most compelling argument in a
post-financial crisis environment for a private right of
action against furnishers for noncompliance with their
FCRA accuracy duties. Even where there is more rigor-
ous public enforcement, inaccuracies will occur, either
inadvertently or as a result of some intentional business
practice.
For example, furnishers have failed to contact
credit bureaus to update trade lines to reflect that a con-
sumer's debt has been discharged in bankruptcy.29 This
216 Burbank, et al., supra note 73, at 665 ("[private enforcement] can
operate as a simple substitute for or adjunct to public enforce-
ment"); Glover, supra note 73, at 1158 ("Even when public enforce-
ment is relatively robust, private enforcement may serve a comple-
mentary regulatory role in the achievement of various substantive
goals."); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86
N.Y.U. L. REv. 698, 706 (2011) ("Where deterrence is the primary goal,
private enforcement can offer a critical supplement to public efforts,
particularly in areas where over-enforcement is less of a concern.").
217 Glover, supra note 73, at 1198-1203.
218 Id.
29 See, e.g., Belton v. GE Capital Consumer Lending, Inc (In re Belton),
No. 12-23037, Adv. No. 14-08223 Complaint (Doc. No. 13) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.) (filed Apr. 30, 2014) (alleging systemic practice of violating
discharge injunction by attempting to collect discharged debt and by
failing to furnish updated data to credit reporting agencies that such
debts were discharged in bankruptcy); Haynes v. Chase Bank USA NA
(In re Haynes), Adv. No. 13-08370 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.); Bruce v.
Citigroup Inc. et al. (In re Bruce), Adv. No. 14-08224 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.);
Echevarria v. Bank of America Corp., (In re Echevarria) Adv. No. 14-
08216 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.); Anderson v. Credit One Bank NA (In re An-
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business practice arguably violates the FCRA-in that
continuing to negatively report the debt as "charged off,"
late or delinquent, or as having a balance of more than
zero is inaccurate-and damages a consumer's credit
worthiness."' It also potentially violates the bankruptcy
discharge injunction, which protects attempts by a credi-
tor to collect a debt which has been discharged in bank-
ruptcy.221 There is some evidence that creditors engage in
this behavior to coerce collection on debts discharged in
bankruptcy.222 The practice is particularly abusive in that
a consumer's credit report reflects a notation that she
filed for bankruptcy-and that notation remains for up
to ten years-but the failure to update the trade line in-
dicates to those considering her for credit that she did
not receive a discharge.
Because the FCRA does not specify how furnishers
should report individual discharged debts to credit bu-
reaus, public regulators may not have been aware of this
unfair, deceptive, and abusive business practice without
consumer litigation. Because consumers cannot sue the
furnishers for FCRA. violations, their recourse is to return
to the bankruptcy court to enforce the discharge injunc-
tion as a way to compel creditors to furnish accurate in-
formation to the credit bureaus concerning the extin-
guished liability for the debt. This class of debtors is
dependent on the bankruptcy court's views about wheth-
er its equitable powers authorize it to compel a creditor
to furnish information to the credit bureau about the
discharge. Some courts are reluctant to conclude that
derson), Adv. No. 15-08214 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.); see also Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy Still Mar Consumer Credit
Scores, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014).
220 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).
221 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). A bankruptcy discharge "operates as an in-
junction against the commencement or continuation of an action,
the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not
discharge of such debt is waived." Id.
222 See, e.g., In re Zine, 521 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014); In re Good-
fellow, 298 B.R. 358 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003)LIn re Mayer, 254 B.R. 396
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000).
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the failure to update is a violation of the discharge in-
junction.2 3 These courts require an additional showing
that the purpose or effect of the failure to update is to
collect the discharged debt, or that it negatively impacts
on the debtor's ability to obtain credit, a job, or insur-
ance. 21 Where a consumer debtor is unsuccessful at the
bankruptcy court, FCRA continues to bar access to jus-
tice, and inaccurate information remains on her report.
Fortunately, private litigation in bankruptcy courts has
raised the profile of this particular credit reporting prac-
tice, resulting in class action settlements against Bank of
America and JPMorganChase, that compel these compa-
nies to change the practice.2 Private litigation thus ful-
filled a failsafe function in this context.
That said, the CFPB may learn about questionable
business practices through its supervisory and examina-
tion procedures and then marshal the information it has
collected to alter furnisher practices and procedures with
respect to reporting discharged debt to credit bureaus.226
Looking to a public regulator to compile, analyze, and act
on information may be equally effective. Where a public
regulator has superior access to and ability to evaluate
information related to the harmful conduct and motiva-
tion to use that information to enforce the law, it should
perhaps have primary enforcement authority.227 It has-
223 See, e.g., In re Giles, 502 B.R. 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013); In re
Montano, 488 B.R. 695 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013); In re Reeves, 369 B.R.
338 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Bruno, 356 B.R. 89 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 2006).
224 See sources cited supra note 198.
225 John Kennedy, BoA, Chase Agree to Delete Debt Discharged in
Bankruptcy, Law360 (May 11, 2015) available at:
http://www.law360.com/articles/654202/bofa-chase-agree-to-delete-
debt-discharged-in-bankruptcy.
226 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 30, at 275 ("[Tlhe CFPB can supervise
and examine companies for compliance with the FCRA. The CFPB
may be able to detect more violations and interdict them earlier than
is possible when using FTC-style, ex post enforcement powers.").
227 Glover, supra note 73, at 1179-80. The "regulator with superior
command of information relevant to potential wrongdoing" should
have enforcement authority as long as it has sufficient incentives to
mobilize the information to enforce the law. Id. at 1177-78; Burbank,
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been suggested that consumer credit is one area in which
a public regulator is better-suited to collect, analyze, and
mobilize information about the business practices of
consumer credit market participants in ways that mate-
rially affect operation of the consumer credit market and
benefit consumers.228
This is arguably true with respect to furnisher lia-
bility because the CFPB has supervisory authority with
respect to furnisher duties under the FCRA. It can use
this authority to collect information about business prac-
tices and procedures with regards to providing infor-
mation to consumer reporting agencies and identify and
correct deficiencies at a systemic level. It could leverage
this information to compel furnisher compliance in a
number of ways. First, the CFPB could informally com-
municate with furnishers concerning best practices and
procedures. Second, it could also initiate a civil en-
forcement action that seeks to halt the illegal furnisher
practices and compel compliance. Finally, it could prom-
ulgate regulations that expressly require furnishers to
adopt certain practices and procedures concerning dis-
charged debt.
Another reason private enforcement of the FCRA
against furnishers would be a useful supplement to pub-
lic regulation is that it provides for remedies that public
enforcement cannot. Private rights of action should be
integrated with other regulatory efforts where necessary
to ensure that the full range of potential remedies is
available to redress wrongdoing, but without creating ex-
cessive liability for the regulated entities.229
Taken together, there are a number of arguments
that robust public regulation of furnisher duties under
the FCRA makes expanding the private right of action to
supra note 73, at 663 (It makes sense to efficiently use public re-
sources to "focus enforcement efforts on violations that do not pro-
vide adequate incentives for private enforcement, while resting as-
sured that those that do will be prosecuted by private litigants.").
228 Glover, supra note 73, at 1181-83.
229 Id. at 1178, 1190.
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impose furnisher liability for inaccuracies (as opposed to
merely a failure to reinvestigate) unnecessary. That said,
the expanded private right of action could act to safe-
guard against potential gaps in public regulation-
private litigation would be an adjunct regulator. Con-
gress could then structure the rules of access to courts
for consumers in ways to promote the FCRA's accuracy
norm but try to filter frivolous or unnecessary lawsuits.
B. Structuring the Private Right of Action
Having decided that a particular statute or provi-
sion requires a private right of action, Congress must
next design the rules that will govern consumer access to
the courts. Of course, the effectiveness of private en-
forcement turns on the mechanism that controls it.
230
Ideally, any private enforcement mechanism should bal-
ance two goals that are in tension: (1) providing ade-
quate incentives to ensure that private regulators litigate,
without which under-enforcement of regulatory objec-
tives would result, and (2) while structuring the rules in a
way that prevents over-enforcement of regulatory objec-
tives. 231 Here, again the failure of FCRA enforcement in-
forms the imperative for deliberate attention to the de-
sign of the rules that control the private right of action.
1. Considerations for Legislating Standing
The first rule of access Congress should prescribe
is that of standing. It should delimit the scope of injury
necessary for a private individual to sue to enforce the
relevant law. In structuring private enforcement mecha-
nisms, Congress should decide who will be permitted to
seek remedies through private litigation, meaning who
230 David Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways: Lessons from
Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. 1913, 1935 (2014) ("[P]rivate en-
forcers can wield agenda-setting and lawmaking power, deploying a
version of what critics have dubbed 'regulation by litigation' to set
industry-wide rules via litigated judgments and settlements that
might otherwise be achieved via legislation or administrative regula-
tion.").
231 Burbank, et al., supra note 73, at 671-79.
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232has standing to enforce the statute.
In particular, Congress should deliberate and de-
cide whether enforcement of a particular provision re-
quires a showing of actual damages as a threshold re-
quirement to suit. Some consumer credit laws impose
civil liability for technical violations of the statute, re-
gardless of whether a plaintiff can demonstrate actual
damages. 233 A strict liability standard for technical viola-
tions without a showing of harm is meant to maximize
the deterrent force of the statute. But there is less of an
imperative to impose liability for technical violations
where there exists a complementary public enforcement
regime designed to focus on deterrence of harmful con-
duct. Where Congress provides for a strong public regu-
lator, there is a more compelling case for requiring a
plaintiff demonstrate actual harm. Where it does not, it
makes more sense to permit individual consumers to sue
regulated entitles based on a theory of strict liability for
technical violations.
In the context of the FCRA, the CFPB's extensive
authority to supervise and regulate the credit reporting
industry arguably moots the need to deploy a private
right of action that imposes strict liability for technical
FCRA violations. Vigorous public enforcement maximizes
incentives to comply with the statute and suggests that
the corresponding private right of action should be per-
mitted only where a plaintiff has suffered actual harm.
One benefit of a rule that mandates a showing of
actual harm in order to sue is efficient use of judicial re-
sources. The rule filters out those instances where even
if there is some violation, the plaintiff has not suffered
quantifiable harm, thereby discouraging unnecessary and
frivolous litigation. Such a rule also promotes the use of
the private right of action as a failsafe mechanism-
plaintiffs who suffer harm arising out of nascent but un-
fair practices are relatively more motivated to avail
232 Id. at 672.
233 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1640.
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themselves of the private right of action for the benefit
of all consumers.
Congress should also consider defining the scope
of what constitutes actual harm in a way that tailors the
standing requirements to the purposes of the statute.
Actual harm is typically conceived of as monetary dam-
ages, or harm that can be quantified in monetary terms.
But quantifying the harm of negative, inaccurate credit
report information may be difficult or even deemed
speculative. In the case of FCRA violations, the most ob-
vious example of harm caused by negative, inaccurate in-
formation would be a lower credit score which may
translate to a denial of credit or an offering of credit on
less favorable terms. Calculating the monetary value of
such harm, while not impossible, is difficult and poten-
tially subject to attack. Nonetheless, the statute should
acknowledge that this type of harm is sufficiently con-
crete to satisfy standing requirements of the private
right of action. Congress should therefore consider what
kind of harm the consumers suffer for violations of the
statute in question, and make sure to account for those
in crafting the standing requirement in the statute.
2. Considerations for Legislating Preemption Rules
Conflicting decisional law concerning the interpre-
tation and scope of the FCRA's preemption rules high-
lights another aspect of a private enforcement regime to
which Congress should devote particular attention.
Preemption rules are important because they dictate as a
threshold matter whether federal or state regulators con-
trol fair credit reporting policy.23 4 At a more granular and
practical level, they delimit the paths of recourse availa-
ble for consumers to access justice in fair credit report-
ing.
Congress created the FCRA's current preemption
rules, but the judiciary implements those rules. The gap
234 Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
163, 168 (2011); Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal
Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 ViLE. L. REv. 1 (1995).
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between structuring and implementing preemption rules
highlights two challenges for Congress. First, Congress
lacks the ability to control or police how the judiciary
implements preemption rules once enacted.235 Implemen-
tation is an exercise in statutory construction.236 Resolu-
tion of statutory construction issue here depends in part
on whether a court is inclined to construe ambiguities in
favor of preemption or against preemption-in other
words, a court's interpretation is colored by its inclina-
tions concerning preemption.237 And where, as here,
there are express preemption rules, the judiciary appears
inclined towards a finding of preemption of federal
law.2
38
A second challenge is that Congress legislates
preemption rules designed to address existing social, le-
gal, and economic conditions, and without the ability to
predict social and economic change, Congress cannot be
sure that those rules are appropriately drawn to adjust
to future conditions. 239 This is particularly true for con-
sumer credit law, an area where Congress acts in reac-
tion to socioeconomic events.
Accordingly, Congress should adopt a more inten-
235 Sharpe, supra note 209, at 177.
236 Id.
237 Stabile, supra note 209, at 37. ("The fact that express preemption
analysis is viewed to be an exercise in statutory interpretation of the
express preemption provision means that courts are limited in their
ability to analyze freely whether federal law should preempt the par-
ticular state law claim with which the court is presented. While dy-
namic theories of statutory interpretation may give courts some
leeway, there are limitations on the courts' ability to read around the
language of an express preemption provision.").
238 Id.
239 Stabile, supra note 209, at 30-31. ("A second cause of problems
created by express preemption provisions is that Congress cannot
make a comprehensive and accurate determination at the time it en-
acts legislation regarding the appropriate breadth of that statute's
preemptive reach. Not only does Congress enact legislation in light
of particular issues and problems, but it enacts such legislation
against an existing social and legal landscape that can be expected
to change over time.").
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tional approach to legislating the FCRA's preemption
rules. First, Congress should define its preemption goals
and second, it should consider how to best implement
those goals, namely through the courts or an agency like
the CFPB.240
Two general goals of preemption are uniformity of
the law and regulatory efficiency. 1 Uniformity speaks to
the federal interest in centralizing and controlling policy
in a particular area.242 Regulatory efficiency speaks to the
concerns about subjecting regulated entities to duplica-
tive or multiplicative regulation and enforcement.2 4' The
problem with these two goals is that courts employ them
to interpret ambiguous statutory interpretations in ways
that conclude Congress intended preemption.24 4 Con-
gress should consider whether and to what extent uni-
formity and regulatory efficiency advances the purposes
of the FCRA. More specifically, Congress should identify
and articulate in the statute what the preemption goals
are: for example, to establish national fair credit report-
ing standards to advance the FCRA's stated purposes. If
it concludes uniformity and regulatory efficiency help to
advance the purposes of the FCRA, then Congress should
craft clear preemption rules that carve out the relevant
state law causes of action.
There is much to recommend uniformity as an im-
portant goal in regulating credit reporting. Congress
should consider whether the relevant state law claims
frustrate federal interests as well as, whether preserving
the availability of the state law claim for private litigants
will advance federal interests of the statute.245
240 Sharpe, supra note 209, at 168.
241 Id. at 177-78.
242 Id. at 168.
243 Id.
244 Stabile, supra note 209, at 22 ("Courts are then left to parrot the
goal of uniformity in their decisions without having the ability to ex-
amine the goal in the context of the statute and the state law claim
at issue.").
245 Id.
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How to best implement those goals really is a deci-
sion about whether an agency or the courts should inter-
pret the preemption rules. Congress should consider
that its ability to control judicial interpretations of the
preemption rules is minimal.2 46 Inability to police the ju-
diciary leads to unintended consequences, such as three
potential interpretations of the same preemption rules.
3. Considerations for Legislating Remedies
Considerations for legislating remedies include: (1)
the range of remedies available to public enforcers, and
whether there are gaps; (2) whether a particular remedy
would further the purposes of the statute; and (3)
whether the remedy, viewed against other available pri-
vate remedies, motivates private litigators to enforce the
law. Among the categories of potential remedies, this
section will consider the relative utility of statutory dam-
ages, punitive damages, actual and compensatory dam-
ages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs in
advancing FCRA's goal of accuracy in credit reporting.
Assuming a plaintiff can demonstrate actual dam-
ages, Congress should permit a prevailing plaintiff to
recover those. It is more difficult to make a clear case for
statutory damages. Statutory damages are damages
whose amount or range is set by law, typically without
regard for whether the plaintiff suffered actual harm.
This gives consumers a procedural advantage because
they need not prove actual damages to state a viable
claim for relief. Many federal statutes, including the
FCRA, offer statutory damages to successful plaintiffs.247
Three policies generally support statutory damag-
es laws. First, they provide incentive to consumers to sue
to enforce their rights even if they have a small amount
246 Sharpe, supra note 180, at 170.
247 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). For willful failures to comply with the Act's
disclosure requirements, plaintiffs may seek statutory damages be-
tween $100 and $1,000. If a person obtains a consumer report under
false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose, the
plaintiff may seek actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater.
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claim. The statutory damages encourage access to courts
both individually, and where permitted, as aggregate
plaintiffs. Arguably, statutory damages make the judi-
cial process more efficient. Plaintiffs need not adduce
evidence to prove the nature and extent of their harm,
thereby expediting the litigation. Finally, they may also
serve punitive and deterrent purposes.
Here again, where there is a robust public regula-
tor empowered to bring civil enforcement actions and
obtain civil fines and penalties either through settlement
or litigation, one might consider eliminating statutory
damages as long as plaintiffs have the ability to aggre-
gate their small amount claims in a class actions. A bar
on statutory damages discourages suits based on tech-
nical violations and opens the courtroom doors to those
where a consumer is able to quantify the measure of
harm she has suffered in monetary damages.
Potential FCRA plaintiffs often want to correct
negative, inaccurate information on a credit report, but
often.cannot obtain that correction without litigation. In
this way, it doesn't make sense that a plaintiff cannot ob-
tain injunctive relief under the FCRA. The unavailability
of injunctive relief for FCRA violations in some jurisdic-
tions runs contrary to the statue's primary purpose-
accuracy in credit reporting. Congress should amend the
statute to permit injunctive relief so that it clearly pro-
vides for a type of relief that is core to the FCRA's pur-
pose, namely the ability to eliminate inaccurate and
harmful information on their credit reports. This would
also open the door to class certification based on injunc-
tive relief, and allow small amount claims to be aggregat-
ed. Consumers could then leverage the class action tool
to adjudicate systemic inaccuracies in consumer credit
reporting.
VI. CONCLUSION
Not long ago Judge Debevoise eloquently admon-
ished Congress for structuring the FCRA's private right
of action in ways that thwart the statute's purposes. Mr.
Burrell's case is only one example of how FCRA has
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failed to accomplish its policy goals largely due to under-
enforcement. The reason for under-enforcement stems
from limitations in the design and deployment of its
public and private enforcement regimes. Weak, flawed
enforcement regimes created a regulatory void in pro-
tecting the accuracy of information credit bureaus main-
tain for consumers.
Is the failure of FCRA enforcement attributable to
inadvertent consequences of a well-intentioned Con-
gress? Is the insulation of the regulated entities from lia-
bility attributable to the politics and pressures of the leg-
islative process? Concrete answers to such questions
may be out of reach. One can only hypothesize and
speculate. But it is clear that the current enforcement re-
gime is not working, not only to the detriment of con-
sumers but also to the detriment of the FCRA's accuracy
norm, which where advanced, benefits consumers and
industry.
This Article aims to put a spotlight on the inade-
quacies of the FCRA enforcement regime by cataloging
its flaws and explaining their consequences to demon-
strate the imperative for reform divorced from the spe-
cial interests of the regulated entities. Further, it charts a
course for such structural reform by synthesizing some
of the scholarship on private enforcement to extrapolate
criteria Congress should consider to create an optimally
effective FCRA enforcement regime.
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